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Abstract
In the node selection game D each of the two players simultaneously selects a node from
the oriented graph D. If there is an arc between the selected nodes, then there is a payoff from
the “dominated” player to the “dominating” player. We investigate the set of optimal strategies
for the players in the node selection game D . We point out that a classical theorem from
game theory relates the dimension of the polytope of optimal strategies for D to the nullity
of certain skew submatrix of the payoff matrix for D . We show that if D is bipartite (with
at least two nodes in each partite set), then an optimal strategy for the node selection game
D is never unique. Our work also implies that if D is a tournament, then there is a unique
optimal strategy for each player, a result obtained by Fisher and Ryan [Optimal strategies for a
generalized “scissors, paper, and stone” game, Amer. Math. Monthly 99 (1992) 935–942] and
independently by Laffond, Laslier, and Le Breton [The bipartisan set of a tournament game,
Games Econom. Behav. 5 (1993) 182–201].
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1. Introduction
A tournament is an oriented graph with no loops and exactly one arc between each
pair of distinct nodes. A tournament game is a two-person, zero-sum game played
on a tournament T as follows. Each player simultaneously selects a node from T .
If T has an arc from the node of Player I to the node of Player II, then Player I
wins 1 unit of money from Player II; if the arc has the opposite orientation, then
Player I loses 1 unit of money to Player II; and no money changes hands if there
is no arc between the two selected nodes, i.e., if the two players select the same
node.
Fisher and Ryan [4] and Laffond et al. [9] independently (and by different methods)
established the following somewhat surprising result about tournament games.
Proposition 1. In any tournament game there is a unique optimal strategy for each
player.
Laffond et al. were motivated by models for voting schemes in the social sciences,
and their mathematical work on tournament games is continued in [1–3,10] and in
Laslier’s book [11]. Fisher and Ryan sought to generalize the children’s game “rock-
paper-scissors”, the tournament game played on the cyclic tournament on three nodes
displayed in Fig. 1. In the unique optimal strategy each player selects each of the
three nodes randomly with probability 1/3.
What happens if we play a similar game on an oriented graph D that is not a
tournament? We refer to such a game as the node selection game D on D. If D is
not a tournament, then an optimal strategy for the node selection game D need not
be unique, as noted by Fisher and Ryan [5].
Example 1.1
(1) Let D1 be the orientation of the star K(1, n − 1) on n nodes with each arc
oriented toward node 1, as in Fig. 1. Then any strategy that avoids node 1 is
optimal, and thus the node selection game D1 does not have a unique optimal
strategy for n  3.
(2) Now reverse each arc in D1 to produce the oriented star D2 in Fig. 1. The
unique optimal strategy for the node selection game D2 selects node 1 with
probability 1.
Fig. 1. “Rock-paper-scissors” is a tournament game. The oriented graphs D1 and D2 give rise to node
selection games.
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Here is the fundamental problem for node selection games.
Problem 2. Let D be an oriented graph.
(a) Find necessary and/or sufficient conditions for the node selection game D to
have a unique optimal strategy.
(b) More generally, characterize the set of optimal strategies for the node selection
game D .
Problem 2(a) was posed by Fisher and Ryan [5]. Our research represents substantial
progress on both (a) and (b). We study relationships among the structure of the oriented
graph D, the size of the set of optimal strategies for the node selection game D , and
linear-algebraic properties of the payoff matrix.
We say that the oriented graph D is uni-optimal or multi-optimal provided the node
selection game D has a unique optimal strategy or more than one optimal strategy,
respectively. Now let G be an ordinary undirected graph. Assign an orientation to
each edge of G to produce an oriented graph D. We say that G is the underly-
ing graph of D. For instance, an oriented graph is a tournament if and only if its
underlying graph is a complete graph. Now each graph G must fall into one of three
categories:
• G is uni-optimal provided every orientation of G is uni-optimal;
• G is ambi-optimal provided G has both a uni-optimal orientation and a multi-
optimal orientation;
• G is multi-optimal provided every orientation of G is multi-optimal.
Our focus will be on connected graphs, as it is easy to see that every disconnected
graph is multi-optimal. In our terminology Proposition 1 assumes the following
form.
Proposition 1′. Every complete graph is uni-optimal.
In Section 4, we establish the converse: every uni-optimal graph is complete. Thus
we have characterized the set of uni-optimal graphs and revealed the special nature
of tournament games and Proposition 1.
The characterization of ambi- and multi-optimal graphs is more challenging. Ex-
ample 1.1 shows that a star with at least three nodes is ambi-optimal. However, stars
are exceptional within the class of bipartite graphs; one of our main results (Section
7) implies that all bipartite graphs except for stars are multi-optimal:
Theorem 3. Every bipartite graph with at least two nodes in each partite set is
multi-optimal.
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Let D be an oriented graph on n nodes. Then the node selection game D is a
two-person, zero-sum game, and it follows from linear programming that the set of
optimal strategies is a convex polytope in Rn. If D is uni-optimal, then the polytope
is just a single point, and thus has dimension 0. However, if D is a multi-optimal
oriented graph, then the dimension of the polytope is at least 1.
This article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide background on two-
person, zero-sum games, and in Section 3 we formally define node selection games.
Uni-optimal graphs are characterized in Section 4. In Section 5, we state a formula
for the dimension of the polytope of optimal strategies for the game D in terms of
the nullity of a certain “supportive” submatrix. A fuller discussion and proof the strat-
egy dimension formula are postponed to Section 10. When applied to a tournament
game, the strategy dimension formula implies that the optimal strategy polytope has
dimension 0, that is, the optimal strategy is unique, and we recover Proposition 1. In
Section 6, we provide some examples. In Section 7 we prove a general result about
the optimal strategy polytope for oriented bipartite graphs. In Section 8 we prove
Theorem 3 and display a counterexample to its converse. Section 9 discusses node
selection games in which every node is selected with positive probability by some
optimal strategy.
2. Background in game theory
Let C = [cij ] be an nI by nII matrix. The matrix game C is a two-person, zero-
sum game in which Players I and II have respective sets of (pure) strategies SI =
{1, . . . , nI} and SII = {1, . . . , nII}. When Player I selects strategy i in SI and Player
II selects j in SII, then Player II pays cij units of money to Player I; a negative payoff
signifies that the money passes from Player I to Player II. The matrix C is the payoff
matrix.
We may extend the strategy sets from pure to mixed strategies. A mixed strategy
for Player k is a nonnegative (row) vector whose nk components sum to 1 (k = I, II).
If x = (x1, . . . , xnI) is a mixed strategy for Player I, then the interpretation is that
Player I selects pure strategy i with probability xi (i = 1, . . . , nI). Thus the ith unit
vector ui in RnI represents the mixed strategy in which pure strategy i is selected
with probability 1. Note that x = ∑nIi=1 xiui for any mixed strategy x. Suppose that
Players I and II select the respective mixed strategies x and y. Then the expected
payoff to Player I equals xCyT.
Let
(n) = {(x1, . . . , xn) : x1 + · · · + xn = 1 and xi  0 for i = 1, . . . , n}
denote the set of all mixed strategies with n components. Thus (nI) and (nII) are
the sets of mixed strategies for Players I and II, respectively. An optimal (or minimax)
strategy for Player I is a mixed strategy x in(nI) that maximizes miny∈(nII){xCyT}.
Similarly, an optimal strategy for Player II is a mixed strategy y in (nII) that
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maximizes minx∈(nI){−xCyT}. Hence an optimal strategy for a player is a mixed
strategy that optimizes that player’s “worst case” expected outcome. By the Minimax
Theorem of von Neuman every matrix game C has a unique value v that satisfies
v = max
x∈(nI)
{
min
y∈(nII)
xCyT
}
= − max
y∈(nII)
{
min
x∈(nI)
−xCyT
}
(see, e.g., [14, pp. 218–222]). The associated mixed strategies x and y that maximize
miny xCyT and minx −xCyT, respectively, must be optimal strategies. Also, if x and
y are optimal strategies for the two players, then xCyT = v.
Dantzig (see, e.g., [12, pp. 99–104]) noted that the set of optimal solutions for
Player k (k = I, II) in a matrix game C may be characterized as the set of solutions
of a particular linear program. Hence these sets of optimal solutions are convex
polytopes; we denote them by OptI(C) and OptII(C). These polytopes are determined
by their extreme points. We regard a matrix game as being completely solved once
we have determined the extreme points of its optimal strategy polytopes.
Lemma 4. Let C be an nI by nII matrix game with value v. Then the sets of optimal
strategies for Players I and II are
OptI(C) = {x ∈ (nI) : xC  (v, . . . , v)},
OptII(C) =
{
y ∈ (nII) : −CyT  −(v, . . . , v)T
}
.
Proof. Let x be in (nI). If xC  (v, . . . , v), then xCyT  v for all y in (nII),
and hence x ∈ OptI(C). Conversely, if the j th component of xC is less than v,
then xCuTj < v, which contradicts the definition of v. This establishes the stated
characterization of OptI(C). The proof for OptII(C) is similar. 
Let  be a subpolytope of (n). Let Span() denote the subspace of all finite
linear combinations of vectors in . We define the dimension of the polytope  by
Dim() = Dim (Span()) − 1.
For instance, Dim((n)) = n − 1. Also, Dim() = 0 if and only if  consists of
a single point.
3. Node selection games
LetQ = [qij ] be a skew matrix of ordern. WithQwe associate a weighted oriented
graph D with node set {1, . . . , n}, where there is an arc of weight qij from node i
to node j provided qij > 0. The weighted node selection game D is the matrix
game with payoff matrix Q. In other words D is identical to the matrix game Q.
(We will refer to the game as Q when we want to emphasize the payoff matrix Q.)
In a weighted node selection game we have nI = nII = n, and the two players have
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identical sets of mixed strategies, namely,(n). We view the two players as selecting
nodes from D with a payoff to Player I of qij units of money when Player I selects
node i and Player II selects node j . In game theory a two-person, zero-sum game with
a skew payoff matrix is called a symmetric game. Thus, our weighted node selection
games are symmetric games. Our graph-theoretic point of view is more suggestive
for the purposes of this article, however.
If each element of Q is in {0, 1,−1}, then Q is an (unweighted) node selection
game. Although our primary interest is in node selection games, we state and prove
most of our results for the more general class of weighted node selection games. If
each off-diagonal element of Q is in {1,−1}, then Q is a tournament game.
The next result is well known from the literature on symmetric games (see [13,
pp. 28–29]) and merely formalizes our intuition that neither player has an advantage
in a symmetric game.
Lemma 5. Let Q be a skew matrix. Then the value of the weighted node selection
game Q is 0. Also, OptI(Q) = OptII(Q).
The optimal strategy polytope of the weighted node selection game Q is the
set Opt(Q) of optimal strategies (for either player). The strategy dimension
Dim(Opt(Q)) of Q is the dimension of the optimal strategy polytope. We seek
relationships among properties of the optimal strategy polytope Opt(Q), the skew
matrix Q, and the associated weighted oriented graph D.
The following characterization of optimal strategies follows immediately from
Lemmas 4 and 5.
Theorem 6. Let Q be a skew matrix of order n. The optimal strategy polytope for the
weighted node selection game Q is
Opt(Q) = {x ∈ (n) : xQ  0}.
Theorem 6 is crucial to our understanding of node selection games, just as the
special case for tournament games was important in the proof of Proposition 1 by
Fisher and Ryan [4].
4. Uni-optimal graphs are complete
Node i in a weighted oriented graph D is a source provided no arc enters i. If D
has a source, then it is intuitively clear that always selecting that source is an optimal
strategy for D . The following result includes a confirmation of this fact.
Lemma 7. Node i is a source in the weighted oriented graph D if and only if the
pure strategy ui is an optimal strategy in the node selection game D .
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Proof. Let node i be a source in D. Then each entry in row i of the payoff matrix Q
is nonnegative, and thus uiQ  0. Now the pure strategy ui is an optimal strategy in
D by Theorem 6. Conversely, if ui is an optimal strategy, then Theorem 6 implies
that row i of Q is nonnegative, and node i is a source in D. 
We remark in passing that it is possible for an optimal strategy to select a sink with
positive probability. (A sink is a node in an oriented graph with no outgoing arcs.)
See Example 9.1.
We are now ready to characterize uni-optimal graphs.
Theorem 8. A graph is uni-optimal if and only if it is complete.
Proof. Proposition 1 implies that complete graphs are uni-optimal. For the converse
let G be a graph that is not complete. Without loss of generality nodes 1 and 2 of G
are not joined by an edge. Now let D be any orientation of G in which nodes i and j
are both sources. Then the game D has more than one optimal strategy by Lemma
7. Therefore G is not uni-optimal. 
5. A formula for the strategy dimension
A node v in a weighted node selection game is supportive provided some optimal
strategy selects v with positive probability. A vector x in (n) is positive provided
every component of x is positive. Let Q be a weighted node selection game with
payoff matrix Q of order n. Without loss of generality the supportive nodes are
1, 2, . . . , n˜, and thus we may write
Q =
[
Q˜ C
−CT R
]
, (1)
where Q˜ is a skew matrix of order n˜ . We refer to Q˜ as the supportive submatrix of
Q. The weighted node selection game Q˜ is the supportive subgame of Q.
When stated in our framework, a result of Gale and Sherman [6] from the early
history of game theory takes the following form:
Theorem 9 (Strategy dimension formula). LetQ be a weighted node selection game
with a skew payoff matrix Q, and let Q˜ be the supportive subgame of Q. Then the
strategy dimensions satisfy
Dim
(
Opt(Q)
) = nullity(Q˜) − 1 = Dim(Opt(Q˜)). (2)
We give a fuller discussion and a new proof of Theorem 9 in Section 10.
Theorem 9 relates the strategy dimension of a game to the nullity of a special
principal submatrix of the corresponding payoff matrix. In some applications we
have enough information about the payoff matrix and its principal submatrices to
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deduce a general theorem from the strategy dimension formula (2). The following
result is a reformulation of another early theorem of Gale and Sherman [6].
Theorem 10. LetQ be a weighted node selection game. Then the strategy dimension
of Q and the number of supportive nodes are of opposite (odd vs even) parity.
Proof. The rank of any skew matrix is even. (One way to see this is to note that a
real skew matrix is diagonalizable and that its eigenvalues lie on the imaginary axis
and occur in complex conjugate pairs.) Thus, the nullity and the order of any skew
matrix are of the same parity. Now suppose that Q has n˜ supportive nodes. Then the
supportive submatrix Q˜ is a principal skew submatrix of Q of order n˜, and the result
follows from Theorem 9. 
If D is a weighted node selection game with a unique optimal strategy, then
the optimal strategy polytope has dimension 0. Hence the following corollary is an
immediate consequence of Theorem 10.
Corollary 11. If a weighted node selection game has a unique optimal strategy, then
the number of supportive nodes is odd.
Corollary 11 and Proposition 1 immediately imply that the number of supportive
nodes in a tournament game is odd, a fact discovered by Fisher and Ryan [4] and by
Laffond et al. [9].
We now deduce a generalization of Proposition 1 from Theorem 9. We require an
elementary lemma.
Lemma 12. Let Q be a skew matrix of order n whose off-diagonal elements are all
odd. Then the nullity of Q equals 0 or 1.
Proof. Replace each off-diagonal element in Q by a 1 to produce a matrix M of
order n whose determinant has the same parity as the determinant of Q. Now M
has 0’s on its main diagonal and 1’s everywhere else, and one readily shows that
det(M) = (n − 1)(−1)n−1. It follows that if n is even, then det(Q) is odd. This
implies that Q is nonsingular, and thus nullity(Q) = 0. On the other hand, if n is odd
(n  3), then any principal submatrix of order n − 1 is nonsingular by the preceding
argument, and hence nullity(Q)  1. 
The following generalization of Proposition 1 first appeared in Laffond et al. [10].
Proposition 13. Let Q be a skew matrix whose off-diagonal entries are all odd. Then
the node selection game Q has a unique optimal strategy.
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Proof. The nullity of every principal submatrix of Q is 0 or 1 by Lemma 12, and
Theorem 9 implies that the dimension of the optimal strategy polytope Opt(Q) is 0.
Therefore Q has a unique optimal strategy. 
6. Some examples
Example 6.1. LetDn denote the directed cycle onn nodes with arcs 1 → 2 → · · · →
n → 1, and let Qn denote the corresponding payoff matrix. Every column of Qn
has sum 0, and thus v = (1/n, . . . , 1/n) is in the null space of Qn. Thus v is a
positive optimal strategy for the node selection game Qn . Now nullity(Qn) = 1 or 2
according as n is odd or even. Thus v is the unique optimal strategy forQn when n is
odd. When n is even, it is not difficult to see that the two extremal optimal strategies
are
2
n
(u1 + u3 + · · · + un−1) and 2
n
(u2 + u4 + · · · + un).
Example 6.2. Laslier [11, Chapter 6] observed that the components of the optimal
strategy vector for a tournament game can exhibit counterintuitive behavior with
respect to arc reversal. We now extend Laslier’s example and show that similar
counterintuitive behavior exists with respect to insertion of an arc in a node selection
game.
For β ∈ {1,−1, 0} we define the matrix Q(β) and the vector xβ in(7) as follows:
Q(β) =


0 1 1 1 −1 −1 −1
−1 0 1 −1 1 1 β
−1 −1 0 1 1 1 1
−1 1 −1 0 −1 1 1
1 −1 −1 1 0 1 −1
1 −1 −1 −1 −1 0 1
1 −β −1 −1 1 −1 0


,
x1 = 125 (7, 5, 1, 3, 3, 1, 5),
x−1 = 135 (9, 5, 7, 1, 1, 7, 5),
x0 = 130 (8, 5, 4, 2, 2, 4, 5).
Now nullity(Q(β)) = 1, and xβQ(β) = 0, and thus xβ is the unique optimal strategy
for the node selection game Q(β) by Theorem 9. The optimal strategy in the node
selection gameQ(0) selects each of the nodes 2 and 7 with probability 1/6. If we now
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insert the arc from 2 to 7, then we obtain the tournament game Q(1); surprisingly,
in the new optimal strategy x1 the probability that node 7 is selected has increased to
1/5. On the other hand, if we insert the arc from 7 to 2, then we obtain the tournament
game Q(−1); surprisingly, in the new optimal strategy x−1 the probability that node
7 is selected has decreased to 1/7.
7. A strategy dimension formula for bipartite graphs
Throughout this section we let D be a weighted oriented graph on n nodes whose
underlying graph is bipartite with partite sets of cardinality mI and mII. Thus mI +
mII = n, and with a suitable labeling of the nodes the payoff matrix for the weighted
node selection game D assumes the form
Q =
[
O C
−CT O
]
, (3)
where C is an mI by mII matrix. When we consider vectors of the form (zI|zII), we
assume that zk has mk components (k = I, II).
Theorem 14 (Strategy dimension formula for bipartite graphs). LetC be anmI bymII
matrix game with value v, and let Q be the bipartite weighted node selection game
defined by (3). Then the optimal strategy polytope for the game Q has dimension
Dim(Opt(Q)) =


mI − 1 if v > 0,
mII − 1 if v < 0,
Dim
(
OptI(C)
)+ Dim(OptII(C))+ 1 if v = 0. (4)
Proof. There are three cases depending on the sign of v.
Case 1. Suppose that v > 0. Let x be in OptI(C). Thus xC  (v, . . . , v) > 0 by
Lemma 4. If  is a sufficiently small positive number, then the vector
z = (1 − )(x|0, . . . , 0) + 
mI
(1, . . . , 1|0, . . . , 0)
in (n) satisfies zQ = (0, . . . , 0|w), where w = (1 − )xC + 
mI
(1, . . . , 1)C > 0.
Thus z ∈ Opt(Q) by Theorem 6. Also, the first mI components of z are positive,
and thus the nodes 1, . . . , mI are all supportive in Q. Moreover, none of the nodes
mI + 1, . . . , n is supportive since zQuTj > 0 for j = mI + 1, . . . , n, and we know
that the value of the game Q is 0. Thus the supportive nodes of Q are 1, . . . , mI,
and the supportive submatrix Q˜ of Q is the leading mI by mI submatrix of 0’s. Now
by Theorem 9 we have Dim
(
Opt(Q)
) = nullity(Q˜) − 1 = mI − 1.
Case 2. Suppose that v < 0. Replace C by CT and apply Case 1.
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Case 3. Suppose that v = 0. Define the polytope
 = {(αzI|(1 − α)zII) : zk ∈ Optk(C), k = I, II, and 0  α  1}
in Rn. We shall show that  = Opt(Q). This will complete the proof because
Dim() = [Dim(OptI(C)) + 1] + [Dim(OptII(C)) + 1] − 1.
First suppose that z = (αzI|(1 − α)zII) is in . By Theorem 6 we have αzIC 
0 and (1 − α)zIICT  0. Then z ∈ (n), and zQ =
(− (1 − α)zIICT|αzIC)  0.
Thus z ∈ Opt(Q) by Theorem 6.
Now suppose that w = (wI|wII) ∈ Opt(Q). We know that wQ  0, which im-
plies that wIC  0 and −wIICT  0. Let α denote the sum of the components of wI.
If 0 < α  1, then we define the vector zI = α−1wI. If 0  α < 1, then we define the
vector zII = (1 − α)−1wII. Also, if α = 0, then we let zI be any vector in OptI(C),
while if α = 1, then we let zII be any vector in OptII(C). In all cases zk ∈ (nk) for
k = I, II. Moreover, zIC  0 and −zIICT  0. Thus zk ∈ Optk(C) for k = I, II. It
follows that w ∈ . Therefore  = Opt(Q). 
8. Consequences of the bipartite strategy dimension formula
Our proof of the strategy dimension formula for bipartite graphs (Theorem 14)
makes the following corollary clear.
Corollary 15. Let D be an oriented bipartite graph with partite sets N1 and N2.
Then the weighted node selection game D possesses an optimal strategy that selects
nodes entirely from N1 or entirely from N2.
The following corollary establishes Theorem 3; every bipartite graph on n nodes
(n  3) is multi-optimal except for the star K(1, n − 1).
Corollary 16. Let D be an oriented bipartite graph on n nodes. Then either D is
multi-optimal, or else D is isomorphic to the oriented star D2 in Fig. 1.
Proof. The result is easy for n = 1 or 2. For n  3 we continue with the notation of
Theorem 14. Suppose that D is not multi-optimal. Then Theorem 14 implies that the
value v of the game C satisfies v /= 0. Suppose that v > 0. Then mI = 1, and each
entry of the 1 by mII matrix C in (3) must be positive because v > 0. This shows that
D is isomorphic to the star D2. The case v < 0 is similar. 
Example 8.1. We now exhibit a multi-optimal graph that is not bipartite. Thus the
converse of Theorem 3 fails (even for connected graphs).
Claim. The graph G6 in Fig. 2 is multi-optimal.
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Fig. 2. The graph G6 and a partial orientation.
Table 1
Orientations of the graph G6 are multi-optimal
Arcs: (q13, q23, q45, q46) Two optimal strategies
(−1, 1, 1,−1) or (−1, 1, 1, 1) 13 (1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0) 14 (1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0)
(−1, 1,−1,−1) or (−1, 1,−1, 1) (0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0) 13 (1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0)
(1,−1, 1,−1) or (1, 1, 1,−1) (1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) 14 (1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1)
(−1,−1, 1,−1) or (−1,−1, 1, 1) (0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0) 12 (0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0)
(1,−1, 1, 1) or (1, 1, 1, 1) (1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) 12 (1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0)
To establish the claim let D be an orientation of G6. Without loss of generality
arcs 1 → 2, 3 → 4, and 5 → 6 occur in D, as in Fig. 2. Each of the other four edges
of G6 has two possible orientations, and thus there are 16 orientations of G6 up to
isomorphism. We must show that these 16 oriented graphs are multi-optimal. Six of
these oriented graphs contain two sources and are thus multi-optimal by Lemma 7.
Table 1 lists the remaining ten orientations ofG6, along with two optimal strategies for
the corresponding node selection games. (The orientations of the remaining arcs are
specified by the four numbers q13, q23, q45, and q46 in the payoff matrix Q = [qij ].)
Therefore G6 is multi-optimal.
9. Positive optimal strategies
If a weighted node selection game D has a positive optimal strategy x, then each
node of D is selected with positive probability by x, and hence every node of D is
supportive. Conversely, if every node of D is supportive, then we may average the
extreme points of the optimal strategy polytope to produce a positive optimal strategy.
In summary, a weighted node selection game has a positive optimal strategy if and
only if every node is supportive.
We note that matrix games in which every optimal strategy is positive (“completely
mixed games”) were studied by Kaplansky at the dawn of game theory [7] and in a
follow-up article written fifty years later [8]. Tournament games with positive optimal
strategies were the focus of an article by Fisher and Ryan [5].
A weighted node selection game with a positive optimal strategy is closely related
to the nullspace of the payoff matrix. Let
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Null(Q) = {x ∈ Rn : xQ = 0}
denote the (left) nullspace of the matrix Q of order n. The right nullspace of Q is
{x ∈ Rn : QxT = 0T}. In all of our discussions Q is a skew matrix, and thus xQ = 0
if and only if QxT = 0T. Thus we may speak of the nullspace Null(Q) with little
danger of confusion. Note that Theorem 6 implies that
Opt(Q) ⊇ Null(Q) ∩ (n). (5)
The following result includes a formula for the strategy dimension of a game with
a positive optimal strategy; it is a special case of the strategy dimension formula
(Theorem 9).
Theorem 17. Let Q be a weighted node selection game with a skew payoff matrix
Q. If Q has a positive optimal strategy, then
Opt(Q) = (n) ∩ Null(Q) and Dim
(
Opt(Q)
) = nullity(Q) − 1. (6)
Proof. Let n be the order of Q, and suppose that x0 is a positive optimal strategy
for Q. Any optimal strategy y of Q must satisfy x0QyT = 0. The positivity of
x0 implies that QyT = 0, that is, y ∈ Null(Q). Thus Opt(Q) ⊆ (n) ∩ Null(Q),
which is the reverse of containment (5). Therefore the first equality in (6) holds. Now
x0 ∈ Null(Q), and thus the null space of Q has a basis of the form {x0, x1, . . . , xp}.
We may assume that xi is positive, for we may bring about this situation by replacing xi
by (1 − )x0 + xi for a sufficiently small positive number  (i = 1, . . . , p). After
a suitable normalization we may also assume that xi ∈ (n) (i = 1, . . . , p). Thus
Null(Q) has a basis contained in (n), and the second equality in (6) follows from
the first one. 
The next example shows that when a node selection game does not have a positive
optimal strategy, then the conclusion of Theorem 17 is far from true; the nullity of
the payoff matrix can differ greatly from the strategy dimension.
Example 9.1. Let Dn denote the directed path on n nodes with arcs 1 → 2 → · · · →
n, and let Qn denote the corresponding payoff matrix. Now nullity(Qn) = 1. It is not
difficult to verify that the following n/2	 vectors are extremal optimal strategies for
the node selection game Qn :
u1,
1
2
(u1 + u3), 13 (u1 + u3 + u5), . . . ,
1
n/2	
(
u1 + · · · + u2n/2	−1
)
.
10. The strategy dimension formula: discussion and proof
LetQ be a weighted node selection game with payoff matrixQof ordern. Without
loss of generality 1, 2, . . . , n˜ are the supportive nodes (i.e., the nodes selected with
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positive probability by at least one optimal strategy). Thus we may write Q in the
form (1) so that the leading skew submatrix Q˜ of order n˜ corresponds to the supportive
nodes. Now each optimal strategy for Q is of the form (˜x |0, . . . , 0), where x˜ has n˜
components. Theorem 6 assures us that x˜ is an optimal strategy for Q˜, and it follows
that
Dim
(
Opt(Q)
)
 Dim
(
Opt(Q˜)
)
. (7)
However, not every optimal strategy for Q˜ extends to an optimal strategy for Q
by appending 0’s. Nonetheless, we shall see that equality holds in (7).
Example 10.1. Consider the node selection game Q played on the oriented path
1 → 3 → 2. The payoff matrix is
Q =

 0 0 10 0 −1
−1 1 0

 ,
and the two extreme optimal strategies are (1, 0, 0) and (1/2, 1/2, 0). Now n˜ = 2,
and the supportive nodes are 1 and 2. The supportive subgame Q˜ is determined by
the matrix Q˜, which is a 2-by-2 matrix of 0’s. The two extreme optimal strategies
for Q˜ are (1, 0) and (0, 1), and the corresponding extended vectors are (1, 0, 0) and
(0, 1, 0); the second of these is not an optimal strategy for the original gameQ. Note,
however, that the optimal strategy polytopes for Q and Q˜ both have dimension 1.
Example 10.1 shows that one cannot establish equality in (7) through a simple-
minded bijection between the optimal strategy polytopes. Our argument relies on the
following result of Tucker [15] concerning “complementary slackness”.
Proposition 18. Let Q be a skew matrix of order n. Then there is a nonnegative vector
x0 with x0Q  0 such that for each j = 1, . . . , n exactly one of the two numbers x0uTj
and x0QuTj is positive, while the other is 0.
We are now ready to prove the strategy dimension formula (Theorem 9).
Proof of Theorem 9. Let 1, 2, . . . , n˜ be the supportive nodes of the game Q so
that the payoff matrix Q is of the form (1). For each vector x˜ with n˜ components,
we let x = (x˜|0, . . . , 0) be the vector with n components obtained by appending 0’s
to x˜. Every optimal vector for Q is of the form x = (x˜|0, . . . , 0), where x˜ is an
optimal vector for the supportive subgame Q˜. Now the supportive subgame Q˜ has
a positive optimal strategy, and thus (by an argument similar to the one at the start
of the proof of Theorem 17) y˜ ∈ Null(Q˜) whenever y = (y˜|0, . . . , 0) ∈ Opt(Q).
Therefore Dim
(
Opt(Q)
)
 nullity(Q˜) − 1 = Dim(Opt(Q˜)) by Theorem 17.
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Let x0 be a vector satisfying Proposition 18. We may normalize x0 so that x0 ∈
(n). Because x0Q  0, we know that x0 = (x˜0|0, . . . , 0) ∈ Opt(Q) and x˜0 ∈
Null(Q˜).
Claim 1. All components of x˜0 are positive.
Assume to the contrary that x˜0uTj = 0 for some j in {1, . . . , n˜}. Then x0QuTj > 0
by Proposition 18. Now some optimal strategy y for Player II has a positive j th
component, and because x0Q  0, this tells us that x0QyT > 0. This is a contradiction
because the symmetric game Q has value 0.
Claim 2. The nullspace of Q˜ possesses a basis of the form {x˜0, x˜1, . . . , x˜r}, where
the extended vectors x0, x1, . . . , xr are optimal strategies for Q.
This claim implies that Dim
(
Opt(Q)
)
 nullity(Q˜) − 1 and completes the proof
of Theorem 9. To establish the claim we begin with any basis of Null(Q˜) of the
form {x˜0, x˜1, . . . , x˜r}. We may suppose that x˜i ∈ Null(Q˜) ∩ (n˜) for i = 1, . . . , r
by replacing x˜i by (1 − )x˜0 + x˜i and normalizing, as in the proof of Theorem 17.
Because the last n − n˜ components of x0 are 0, Proposition 18 tells us that each
component of x˜0C is positive. It follows that by choosing  sufficiently small we may
assume that x˜iC > 0. Now we see that xiQ =
(
x˜iQ˜|x˜iC
)
 0 for i = 0, . . . , r, and
Theorem 6 tells us that the extended vectors x0, x1, . . . , xr are optimal strategies for
Q. 
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